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Editorial
The Role of Incident Reporting in Continuous Quality
Improvement in the Intensive Care Setting
Quality in clinical care and overall management
have become major issues in health care provision.
Quality must be differentiated from efficiency:
making medical care more efficient does not neces-
sarily improve its quality. Also, achieving the highest
possible standards from the perspective of all groups
who could be construed as “customers” of an inten-
sive care unit (e.g. relatives and friends of patients,
trainees, referring doctors) is unlikely to reflect the
best use of resources. With limited resources, gaining
the greatest increase in quality and quantity of life
(“health”) for each available dollar and having a
humane approach in a sympathetic environment
(likely to lead to “satisfaction”) must be the prime
aims
1. Thus, improvements in the quality of clinical
care should ultimately be verified by direct measure-
ments of the improved health, functional status and
satisfaction of the individuals in the population
served
2.
In intensive care, however, key outcomes may be
late and affected by factors not influenced by medical
care. For example, the nature and severity of the
disease may be more important in determining out-
come than individual treatment options. The chal-
lenge is to develop outcomes that are measurable and
relevant to intensive care. Final outcome measures
that have been used include: mortality rates in inten-
sive care, in hospital and six months after discharge;
comparison of predicted versus actual mortality rates;
length of stay in intensive care and in hospital; neuro-
logical outcome and measurements of functional
status
3,4.
Intermediate outcome variables have included
measurements such as the frequency of incidents,
intensive care readmissions or nosocomial infections,
adequacy of analgesia or sedation, duration of venti-
lation/intubation, and indicators of patient or relative
satisfaction.
Although initiatives are underway to improve out-
come measures, it is still important to pay close
attention to “structure” and “process” in intensive
care, both of which must underpin any improvements
in outcome. The “structure” of intensive care in
Australia and New Zealand (e.g. buildings, equip-
ment, staffing levels) is generally of a very high
standard, and is likely to be safeguarded by the
requirements of both bodies which accredit hospitals
and intensive care units for training.
Attention to “process” requires continuous assess-
ments of and improvements in quality of care. One of
two basic approaches can be adopted
1,5. The first
approach is concerned with the isolation of “low-
quality” outliers and often results in taking punitive
action, whereas the second approach focuses on
improving the general, average level of care. Here the
focus is on problems with the system rather than with
people and on learning, not defensiveness. Excel-
lence as well as deficiency of care are considered.
This approach assumes that even when people make
a mistake, underlying problems with the system such
as poor job design, failure of leadership, or unclear
purposes can often be identified. People are seen as
having good intentions and team participation to
improve quality of care is encouraged. This approach
is based on the theory of continuous improvement
1,6.
It involves an iterative loop of monitoring activities,
assessment and analysis of variations in practice,
instituting interventions and follow-up. It consists of a
series of internal, organization-based, professionally
led efforts to improve many small processes of care in
a ceaseless cycle of examination and change
5.
In seeking to improve the system it is first necessary
to determine what is going wrong. This can be moni-
tored prospectively, with appropriate information
systems, by measuring variances from predetermined
clinical pathways, i.e. applying statistical process con-
trol to each clinical problem, but this is expensive and
lies somewhere in the future for most of the condi-tions treated in intensive care. A simpler approach is
to analyse the circumstances surrounding anything
which goes wrong (adverse events).
Adverse events can be caused by human error, 
by problems inherent in complex systems and, 
most commonly, by combinations of these. Error
researchers typically find that at least 80% of serious
incidents in complex systems where humans and
machines interact involve human error
7,8. Two broad
categories of errors exist — active and latent errors.
Active errors are usually immediate precursors to an
incident or accident, whereas latent errors may occur
well before the time of an accident, and are em-
bedded in the milieu in which an unintended action
or active error may lead to an incident or accident.
Although human errors must be seen as a normal
part of everyday life, their effects and frequency may
be reduced with a clearer understanding of the
processes underlying them.
Thus, an initial first step in the desire to improve
the safety of patients is to identify adverse or poten-
tially adverse events to try to elucidate the underlying
causes and contributing factors. Useful processes are
in place to monitor major adverse events
9,10 and these
include mortality reports, morbidity reports, medical
defence reports, “closed claims” studies, hazard
alerts, medical record analysis and anecdotes or ex-
perience. Although the major events detected by
these methods are easy to identify and define, they
are insensitive indicators of overall patient safety.
Techniques utilizing the reporting of all incidents do
not require death or injury to occur to identify errors,
suffer less from “outcome bias” and may elicit rich
detail about contributing factors
11,12. Anonymous
incident reporting has the advantage that it is rela-
tively cheap, potentially universally applicable,
medico-legally safe and may elicit a large volume of
relevant, specific information
13,14. This approach, how-
ever, does not provide a numerator or denominator,
so that the absolute incidence of a particular type of
problem cannot be assessed. Nevertheless, a great
deal of detailed information about the qualitative
nature of what is happening can be gained from inci-
dent monitoring, and this is perfectly adequate for
designing both prospective studies and preventive
strategies
15. All the methods listed above have their
own advantages and disadvantages, and should be
regarded as complementary rather than mutually
exclusive.
The purpose of a systematic method of investi-
gating incidents is to determine causal factors and to
prevent future incidents. The chain of responsibility
to prevent the occurrence of any incident may be long
and complex, and the entire system needs to be
addressed: the person reporting the incident is only
one link. Incident investigation should aim to deter-
mine what happened, how it happened and to make
recommendations to prevent it happening again.
Incident monitoring is a means of identifying deficits
in quality of care, and an important first step in the
quest for Quality Management in Intensive Care. A
number of steps are involved in the prevention and
management of errors, incidents and accidents. They
include: finding out what is going on, collating this
information, categorizing problems, developing
strategies, putting them into place, and then assessing
if these are working
8.
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study in
Intensive Care (AIMS-ICU) was established to
identify and report incidents which are potentially
harmful to patients being cared for in the intensive
care environment. This project systematically
examines incidents, as well as the causes and pre-
ventive measures associated with these incidents, at a
national level. A voluntary anonymous incident
reporting system is used, which is medico-legally safe
and provides prospectively collected qualitative infor-
mation. Qualitative research methodology is particu-
larly useful where problems are complex, contextual
and influenced by the interaction of physical, psycho-
logical and social factors, and thus seems well suited
to probing the factors behind human error and system
failure in the complex environment of the intensive
care unit. It may be regarded as hypothesis generat-
ing research: quantitative research methods may then
be better directed at problem areas identified by
qualitative methods
15. The details of the methodology
used to develop, introduce and evaluate an anony-
mous voluntary incident reporting system in intensive
care are given on pages 314-319 and the findings of
the first year of incident reporting are described on
pages 320-329 of this issue of the Journal
16,17.
The next step is to gather sufficient information 
to allow a detailed analysis of the specific areas in
which our care most frequently fails, compromises
patient safety and generally increases cost. Initial
analysis of incidents reported so far suggests that this
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